Showing posts with label malware. Show all posts
Showing posts with label malware. Show all posts

Sunday, June 6, 2021

Training! Cyber5W, CyberDefenders and more

Hello all, thanks for looking in.

As I continue trying to figure out what I want to be if/when I grow up, I'm finding so many awesome learning resources, including websites that offer basic introductions to DFIR and other infosec topics along with sites that have challenges to work through. I mentioned in an earlier post that I was considering a move toward learning to be a SOC analyst and that is still a possibility, though not my final goal. I hope one day to qualify for a digital forensic role with some company and I'm trying to learn all I can to make that happen. While I've been working on blue team training and exercises, I keep seeing amazing DFIR training opportunities and find I'm spending a lot more time on them than anything else at the moment.

I've recently started working on challenges at CyberDefenders. They have a variety of challenges for disk and memory forensics, malware, network traffic analysis and more. I completed a memory forensics challenge there a couple days ago called DumpMe. I had forgotten how much fun it was to work with Volatility. I learned a lot doing the challenge.

As has usually been the case for me, my training budget is mostly non-existent so I'm always on the lookout for low cost/no cost learning opportunities. I saw mention of a new training site while viewing my Twitter feed a couple weeks ago and I'm excited to see this site develop.

The Cyber5W Academy has multiple low cost and no cost training courses available. The 5W part of the name alludes to "who, what, where, when and why. The site is run by Professor Ali Hadi, Ph.d, who also teaches forensics and security courses at Champlain College. Cyber5W offers digital forensic consulting and on-site training as well.

The courses are broken down into three categories: Intro to Forensics, Windows Forensics and Linux Forensics. Quite a few courses are already available and many more are under development. All courses at the time of this post are either free or $50. The courses are online PDF based and include instruction, hands on exercises and the occasional quiz. Each course provides a certificate of completion as well.

I've been working my way through the Intro courses as I try to find my way to a DFIR role somewhere. They are helping me remember so much of what I've forgotten over the 5 years since I last did any forensic work. They are also introducing new ideas and helping me get up to speed on what is the current norm for forensic investigations. I especially liked the digital forensic reporting course, as reporting has always been something I enjoy. I intend to work my way through the available courses in all three categories.

I contacted Ali Hadi to thank him for this great learning opportunity and asked if he would tell me about his motivation for creating the Cyber5W Academy. He kindly replied and allowed me to share his thoughts here on the blog.
The Nobel Prize for an educator, is seeing his students being successful. There is literally nothing better than that and those success stories are prizes I love to collect. Now, currently teaching at Champlain College, allows me to engage with how many students per year? A hundred, two hundred, triple that number? It's good, I'm grateful, but still not much! But what if I am be able to teach and engage with thousands around the world? That's a great motivation! This is not the first educational organization that I have established, there are others, and they all share the same core goal "helping others".
Ali has created courses on other sites as well, including Hacking Techniques and Intrusion Detection, Digital Forensics Professional and Malware Analysis. He also has Offensive Software Exploitation and other great material on his YouTube channel.
I've received so many positive feedback, thank you and appreciation messages, network connection requests, etc, which I'm very happy that I was able to help those students advance in their careers, but also grateful for the opportunity. I thought now is the time in my career to start my own path and focus on something that I really love, which is teaching Digital Forensics.
He views Cyber5W as a way for him to help others, notably including those with little money to spend on quality training.
I do not want money to be a barrier for those who want to learn; I want to help as much as I can. Another important aspect, is the world is now so dependable on technology, and this means more abuse/crime/incidents/etc are going to happen. Unfortunately, that's true, so we need more investigators/fighters, we need more people to make this world a better place for our beloved ones. Therefore, I hope C5W will be able to encourage new people to start their DFIR journey, raise more awareness to DFIR, increase the DFIR community members, and also be a resource they can all depend on!
I'm looking very forward to seeing what all Ali has in store for Cyber5W. I'm having fun learning from his courses and can't wait to see what's next.

One other course I just purchased yesterday and plan to start working on soon is Cyber Security Incident Response: Wannacry Ransomware. The course is on Udemy and was authored by Balazs Lendvay.

The course is designed to teach the following (list taken from the Udemy course page):
Investigate and understand the behavior of the Wannacry ransomware in a lab environment using your own computer if you will.
Triage and identify indicators of compromise.
Live-analysis of the infected lab machine for windows artifacts
Static-analysis of the identified executable and artifacts
Sandbox analysis of the malicious activity, including network activity, processes, services, autoruns
Create a summary report of the incident and identify remediation recommendations

I've always liked learning about malware analysis, so it should be a lot of fun working through this course.

By the way, have you noticed how I keep mentioning the word "fun"? That's because learning is fun and it's my hope that more people will come to realize that. I'm very grateful to the people behind all these low cost and no cost courses for making this kind of fun available.

And with that, I will end this post. Hope to be back soon with some more cool stuff.

Saturday, August 13, 2011

Interesting Malware Trick

Sometimes it's hard to keep from admiring the tricks the various malware purveyors come up with. A couple days ago, my friend Luby (Luby Warning Luby Warning Luby Warning) sent me a malware sample he'd received as an email attachment. The filename was "Changelog_08_08_201atdoc" and its icon gave it the appearance of being a Microsoft Word document:


It would be easy to see that icon and not notice the "doc" part of the filename had no dot between it and the rest of the name to make a proper filename extension.   Fortunately, Luby knows better than to open such an attachment and he started looking into it further, hashing it with FTK Imager. He noticed that when viewing the spreadsheet produced by FTK Imager, that the filename appeared as "Changelog_08_08_201at[U+202E]cod.exe" while copying and pasting the file using Windows Explorer, the filename looked like "Changelog_08_08_201atexe.doc".

He did some research and found that the characters within the brackets represent a Unicode Right to Left Override, where anything after the inserted Unicode control character is reversed in the way it is displayed. Thus, the "cod.exe" is displayed as "exe.doc" but the system still knows what it is and executes it when you double click it. You can read about similar uses of Unicode in this Microsoft Malware Protection Center blog post that came out the same day I received the file from Luby.

I'm sure this is nothing new to many people, but I must admit I'd never heard of such a thing. Like I said above, it's almost hard to keep from admiring cool tricks, but then I remember the reason for the trick and it's not so cool.

I found the executable file was packed with the UPX packer. I uploaded it to Virustotal and found 32 of the virus checkers there recognized the file as malicious:
 
Notice most everything listed under the File name (Submission date, Current Status, etc) is backwards. The Unicode in the file name even affected the VirusTotal display.

Not satisfied with what I'd found so far, I executed the malware file in a Windows XP virtual machine and obtained an image of RAM using the new free tool from Moonsols called DumpIt. I'd been wanting a good opportunity to try out DumpIt and this seemed like as good as any.

I saved the RAM image and moved to my analysis machine where I proceeded to examine it with the awesome Volatility Framework. I decided to obtain a copy of the unpacked executable from RAM and Volatility is perfect for that, using the procexedump plugin. After obtaining the unpacked executable, I uploaded it to VirusTotal and found this:

   
Only 10 out of 43 antivirus products on VirusTotal recognized the unpacked malware. I thought that was kind of interesting. My AV of choice was one of those that didn't recognize it in either the packed or unpacked versions, so I submitted both samples to them so signatures could be created (signatures for both now exist for Vipre Antivirus).

I searched online for some of the names given for this malware by the various AV vendors and only found a little information. I submitted the packed version of the malware to ThreatExpert.com and got a good report. Instead of me retyping it, you can have a look here: ThreatExpert Report.

By the way, I checked the headers from the original email sent to Luby and found it came from Austria. I'm planning to spend a little more time looking at this file soon, but have a couple other projects to take care of first. If I find anything new and interesting, I'll be sure to post about it.

Addendum: I wanted to give the MD5 of the packed exe for those who create their own signatures: FE84E712F52AF7B0F0F3FC58296FEE00.

Friday, December 17, 2010

Taming the Wild Beast--Part One

Recently, I was asked to look at a pc owned by a church.  The machine had been running poorly and was being used for nothing more than playing music for the pastor while he worked in his office, as its performance was so bad it just wasn't good for much else.  This didn't start out as a malware investigation, per se, so some of the steps I initially took probably weren't appropriate for that.  However, after finding some interesting stuff, I decided to look into it further.

I set the computer up in my home lab and booted it.  The OS was Windows XP Home, service pack 2.  I noticed right away it was not running any antivirus.  Given the lack of recent Windows updates or antivirus, I figured I'd find some kind of malware.  A quick run with Malwarebytes Anti-Malware proved I was correct in that assumption.  In addition to a registry key, which I'll describe later in this post, it identified an infected file at C:\DATA\FILES\BEAST.exe.

I opened up My Computer and then the C: drive to take a look before doing anything else.  Strangely enough, no folder called DATA was there.  Enabling the display of hidden files also failed to show the folder.  Finally, unchecking the box to hide operating system files revealed my folder.  Inside DATA, as expected, was a folder called FILES.  I expected to find the BEAST.exe file in there, but much to my surprise I saw the contents of the Recycle Bin and no beasts in sight.  This is the first malware I've dealt with in quite awhile that puts itself in a brand new location it creates and then hides it with system attributes.

This was getting interesting for a malware noob like me.  Honestly, I found it ironic and kinda funny that "the beast" was in a church computer and wondered if an exorcism was more in order than a malware removal.  I had several friends on Twitter inquire as to whether the malware was running with PID 666.

Instead of imaging memory on the church machine, I decided to grab a copy of the malware and run it later in a controlled environment in order to grab a memory capture.  I haven't had time to do that part yet, but plan to do so in the next day or two.  I  shut the system down, imaged the disk and made a "super" timeline from it, all using the superb SANS Sift Workstation VM running in VMWare Workstation.

The Sift workstation is something I use all the time.  It has so many things included in it, so it makes getting things done much easier.  In this case, I used it for making the timeline, as well as browsing the filesystem in the image from the relative safety of the Linux operating system so as to protect myself from "the beast".  For those unfamiliar, a Super Timeline is created using Kristinn Gudjonsson's Timescanner from Log2Timeline, along with fls and mactime from the Sleuthkit by Brian Carrier and the regtime.pl perl script by Harlan Carvey.  It provided me with some interesting info which I'll talk about in part two.

During this time, I also extracted the registry files from the system32\config directory, as well as the ntuser.dat from the main user account on the system.  I find that I use Harlan's RegRipper on nearly every type of exam I do these days.  If you're doing forensics and not using RegRipper, you're shorting yourself because it provides an amazing amount of information in an easily readable format.  It, too, provided me with some very relevant information related to this exam and I will cover it all as well in part two.

This didn't start out to be a multi-part post, but I'm finding this one is already very long.  Therefore, I shall continue in part two as soon as I can.